Export Subsidies as Signals of Competitiveness. In a Cournot duopoly model of international competition between a domestic and foreign firm, it is shown that when the foreign firm has incomplete information about the marginal cost of the domestic … Expand. We characterize the optimal export promoting policies for international markets whose structure is endogenous. Contrary to the ambiguous results of strategic trade policy for markets with a fixed … Expand.
Export subsidies in an imperfectly competitive market when market share matters: The case of international wheat trade. A dynamic, game theoretic model with switching costs provides better understanding of motives that keep export subsidies a part of exporters' agricultural policies. Switching costs include factors, … Expand. Endogenous Market Structures and International Trade. I extend the endogenous market structures approach to international trade theory and policy.
When markets are characterized by strategic interactions and endogenous entry, opening up to trade … Expand. This paper analyses how strategic export policies are affected by introducing an imperfectly competitive intermediate good into a Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation, where a home and … Expand.
View 1 excerpt, cites background. Export market correlation and strategic trade policy. In the traditional models of strategic trade policy pioneered by Brander and Spencer, exports of the domestic firm, engaged in a Cournot-Nash competition with the foreign firm in a neutral market, … Expand.
This paper considers the optimal public ownership policy of an upstream firm which competes with a foreign private rival. Both firms supply a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream … Expand. View 2 excerpts, cites background and methods. The tax competition literature usually specifies competitive product markets, so that the rent-shifting effect is overlooked.
By incorporating an duopolistic product market, this paper considers two … Expand. View 2 excerpts, cites methods and background. This paper focuses on the effect of output subsidies in an economic union in the context of a third-market model where there are two countries which produce a homogeneous good consumed in a third … Expand. Abstract Why do governments seek restrictions on the use of export subsidies through reciprocal trade agreements such as GATT?
In this paper, we emphasize that subsidy competition between governments … Expand. Abstract : The use of direct and indirect subsidies to promote exports is a popular instrument of trade policy in many countries. Of particular concern in this study is the use of such subsidies to … Expand. On Domestic Demand and Ability to Export. Journal of Political Economy. In a recent paper, Basevi discusses the assertion that domestic demand is a prerequisite for developing an export industry Basevi Following the analysis of price discrimination, Basevi shows … Expand.
View 1 excerpt, references background. In this paper we ask whether a policy of targeted export promotion can raise domestic welfare when several oligopolistic industries all draw on the same scarce factor of production.
Our point of … Expand. Highly Influential. View 7 excerpts, references background. Domestic Demand and Ability to Export. Recent contributions to international trade theory have attempted to introduce new and more concrete elements into traditional explanations of comparative advantage.
Countries often perceive themselves as being in competition with each other for profitable international markets. In such a world export subsidies can appear as attractive policy tools, from a national point of view, because they improve the relative position of a domestic firm in noncooperative rivalries with foreign firms, enabling it to expand its market share and earn greater profits.
In effect, subsidies change the initial conditions of the game that firms play. The terms of trade move against the subsidizing country, but its welfare can increase because, under imperfect competition, price exceeds the marginal cost of exports.
International noncooperative equilibriumis characterized by such subsidies on the part of exporting nations, even though they are jointly suboptimal. Download Citation Data. Brander, James A. Share Twitter LinkedIn Email. Working Paper
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